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CHAPTEIR 1
INTRDDUCnON
Backqrounf^
Scx^ially undesirable behaviors such as cheating and stealing are
common behaviors with widespread consequences. The "consumer crime"
of shoplifting has been estimated to cost U.S. businesses up to five
billion dollars every year in direct losses, not including expenses
for security programs (Kallis & Vanier, 1985) . And, although the
effects of academic dishonesty cannot be estimated in terms of
economic losses, the results of such "crimes" are no less
devastating. Given the effect of such behaviors on society, it is
not surprising that social scientists have been attracted to the
study of behaviors like shoplifting and cheating.
Some investigations have focused on practical issues, such as
assessing media communications designed to discourage shoplifters
(Sacco, 1985)
,
and developing employment testing prxjgrams to detect
potentially dishonest workers (Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, in
review; Sackett & Harris, 1984) . Others have taken a more
psychological approach, theorizing that personality traits (E.A.
Beck & Mclntyre, 1977) or thought processes (Weaver & Carroll, 1985)
may differentiate between shoplifters and non-shoplifters.
Hartshome and May's (1928) extensive series of studies on deceit
concentrates on biographical features of cheaters and noncheaters,
yielding an important compilation of methods for studying deception,
but little of general theoretical interest.
More relevant to social psychological research is Corey's (1937)
study using classroom cheating cis the target behavior, v^ich was one
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of the first e^lorations of the relation between attitudes and
behavior. Corey found no correlation betv^een attitudes toward
cheating and actual cheating behavior, but recent advances have made
improved prediction of overt behavior possible. DeVries and Ajzen
(1971), in si^port of Fishbein's (1967) n«del, demonstrated that
behavioral intentions and self-reports of cheating were hi^y
correlated with attitudes toward cheating as well as perceived
social norms related to cheating. Furthermore, other variables,
such as sex, GPA, and religiosity, were generally unrelated to
behavioral intention and its predictors. Fishbein's model set the
stage for two important theories enabling behavioral prediction.
Theory of Planned Behavior
Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action and, more
recently, the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) have
generated a great deal of research focusing on the prediction and
explanation of behavior. Both theories hold that voluntary behavior
is most closely linked to intention . vMch reflects motivation, and
determines how hard an individual will try to perform a particular
behavior (see Figure 1) . The prediction of behavior from intention
is only limited by the currency of information about the intention.
One intention may be replaced by another up until the mctment the
intended behavior is performed. Intention is in turn influenced by
several factors v*iich result from sets of salient beliefs about
performing the behavior. Attitude toward a particular behavior is
defined as the strength of an individual's positive or negative
evaluation of performing the behavior. Subjective norm refers to
the individual's perception of social pressure to perform or not
2
Figure 1.
The Iheory of Planned Behavior
perform the behavior, and the willijigness to comply with others'
wishes. Some behaviors may not be completely under volitional
control, and the theory of planned behavior makes provision for such
cases, by including a third factor, perceived behavioral control
,
which is the degree of perceived ease or difficulty of performing
the behavior, as represented in the figure by an unbroken arrow from
the control conponent to intention. Hie broken arrow in Figure 1
indicates that perceived behavioral control can also be linked to
behavior directly, to the extent that perceptions of control reflect
the individual's actual control over performing the behavior.
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Each Of the three cc^nents influencing intention is a fi^lon
Of a relevant set of beliefs. AttibKtes correspond to behavioral
belies, relati^ to the per^iv«j c«toc™es of performing a specific
behavior. Each belief contritates to attitude in proportion to the
subjective prctoability that the outcome will occur. Subjective
norms are determined by nonnative iefs, the livelihood that other
individuals or groups would approve or disafprove of performii^ the
behavior, wei^ted by the individual's motivation to conply with
each of the individuals or groups. Control belief.^ are associated
with the third component, perceived behavioral control, and refer to
factors that are perceived to facilitate or hinder behavioral
performance, relative to the strength of the value placed on each
fac±or.
Research on the theory of planned behavior has shown that
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control can
predict intention and behavior (e.g. Ajzen & Madden, 1986, Schifter
& Ajzen, 1985)
.
Although some research has tested the model's
application to socially undesirable or deviant behaviors (e.g.
Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988) , most has concentrated on more
socially acceptable behaviors such as weight loss (Schifter and
Ajzen, 1985) and class attendance (Ajzen and Madden, 1986) . The
present studies were conducted to test the theory of planned
behavior in predicting undesirable behaviors (cheating, shoplifting,
and lying to get out of class assignments) in a college sanple.
Ihese behaviors were selected because they are common and familiar
to college students, and because they represent inportant issues in
economic and academic dishonesty.
4
There is sane evidence that "crMinal.; behavior does not confoo.
to rational, e.^«cted utility niles (cited in Weaver & Carroll,
1985)
,
but that criminals view situations in unconventional ways,
perceiving opportunity and challei^ge v^ere noncriminals perceive
certain punishment. This view may seem to suggest that the rational
approach to predicting behavior may not be appropriate for behaviors
like cheating, shoplifting, and lyii^. However, the theory of
planned behavior assumes that every behavior is in some sense
reasoned, in that it does not occur without cognitive support,
however unconventional that sipport may be. The current study is
based on this assunption, and tests the applicability of the theory
in predicting socially undesirable behavior.
Moral Obligation
Fishbein's (1967) theory, the forerunner of the theory of
reasoned action, originally included a measure of personal normative
beliefs as a third predictor of behavioral intention (in addition to
attitudes and social normative beliefs) but this conponent proved to
be essentially equivalent to behavioral intention, and was dropped
from the model (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1969; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970).
However, Gorsuch & Ortberg (1983) have recently reported that a
moral obligation component was useful in the prediction of
behavioral intentions for certain situations. Gorsuch and Ortberg
used a sanple of adult Protestant Sunday school members, who could
be expected to have similar perceptions of the moral relevance of
particular situations. In the two situations chosen as morally
relevant by the authors (returning a mistaken $500 check from the
IRS; turning down a promotion that would require missing church on
5
Sunday), as well as one of the two situations selected as not beix^
morally relevant (goir^ to a later chur^ service than planned)
, the
moral obligation conponent (assessor by responses on a 7-point agree
vs. disagree scale to the c^estion, "i have a iroral obligation to
.
.
.") accounted for a significant proportion of the variance, ihe
results obtained by Gorsuch and Ortberg indicate that a moral
ciDligation corrponent may be appropriate for the prediction of
behaviors liJ^ cheati.^, stealir^ and lyi.^, so measures of moral
obligation are included in the present studies.
Social Desirability
Some subjects respondijig to questionnaire items about socially
undesirable behaviors may tend to distort their responses to be
consistent with perceived social ejqjectations. A widely-used test
of social desirability motivation is included in the present studies
in order to measure individual differences in social desirability
responding. Ihe Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; 33
items; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was developed to detect the tendency
of clinically normal individuals to distort responses ("fake good")
in psychometric situations. The SDS is based on the same reasoning
as the MMPI Lie subscale, but uses items which are more relevant to
a nonnal population, for example, "I'm always willing to admit it
v*ien I make a mistake", and "I always try to practice what I
preach"
.
Reasoned vs. Spontaneous Action
Given its previous success with predicting many different
behaviors, the theory of planned behavior is hypothesized here to
predict socially undesirable behaviors as well. However, it is also
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possible that the theory of planned behavior will be less successful
in accounting for undesirable behaviors. A behavior such as
shoplifting may not always be based on stable intentions. For
exaitple, someone in a store may find an attractive item, notice that
no one is near, and impulsively walk out with the item hidden in a
pocket, such behavior is not strictly rational or planned, and may
not be predictable from questionnaire rinses, ihis action may
even directly contradict the individual's beliefs about stealing.
Individual differences in the tendency toward reasoned action would
affect the prediction of behavior in the context of the theory of
planned behavior.
Four different scales are used to detect the moderating effects
of individual differences in reasoned vs. spontaneous or iirpulsive
action. The Spontaneous Action and Reasoned Action Scales (Ajzen &
Watters, unpublished) were recently devised specifically to
differentiate between subjects whose behavior tends to be
spontaneous or intuitive, and subjects whose behavior tends to be
more reasoned, and therefore more predictable within the framework
of the theory of planned behavior.
S.B.G. Eysenck & H.J. Eysenck (1977) have developed an
ijipulsiveness scale v^ich is conposed of 43 items from several
different impulsiveness measures. The items form four different
factors underlying the broad measure of iirpulsiveness: narrow
iupulsiveness, vMch is correlated positively with Eysenck'
s
neuroticism and psychoticism personality dimensions, risk-taJcing,
non-planning, and liveliness.
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A related personality factor is measured by the Need for
cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo & l^tty, 1986). This 18-item scale
measures an individual's notivation to engage in and enjoy effortful
analytic tasks. Subjects' scores on these scales provide infonnation
as to the moderating influences of the disposition to non-reasoned
action on the attitude-behavior relationship.
Ihe hypothesis of the present study is that the relationship
between predictors and behavior will be stronger for subjects who
have dispositions toward reasoned action, and weaker for those with
dispositions toward spontaneous action. This study will also
provide information on more general differences in the importance of
reasoned action. Certain behaviors may differ in susceptibility to
spontaneous performance. For instance, lying to get out of a class
assignment is probably less likely to be a spontaneous behavior than
shoplifting, and cheating may lie between the two.
Honestv of Self-Reports
The present research depends on self-reports of undesirable
behavior as the criteria for prediction. Unfortunately, dishonest
self-reports are undetectable and could affect the results. This
concern is made especially salient by a recent study of tax evasion
(Hessing, et al., 1988; Elffers, Weigel, & Hessing, 1987) which
calls self-reports of deviant behavior into question. In this
study, only 31% of objectively identified tax-evaders admitted to
having misrepresented their income or deductions for the years in
question, despite the subjects' knowledge that official
documentation of their behavior was available to the researchers.
^foreover, 25% of nonevaders (as determined by independent reviewers
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using strict criteria) admitted to havirg misrepresented their
income or deductions. Attitude measures were shown to predict self-
repgrts of deviant behavior, but not actual deviant behavior.
However, the questions used by the investigators may not have
been valid for the purposes of their study. Hessing et al. (1988)
reported responses to the question "Did you, when filing your 1981
tax return, underreport your income or report unwarranted
deductions?" Althou^ all of the respondents in the "evader*'
category had settled government claims against them, many may have
believed that they had done nothing wrong and had been treated
unfairly by the government. On the other hand, respondents in the
"nonevader" category may have had income that was not subject to
third party reporting (cash gifts, etc.) so that even close
examination of their records would not reveal the inconsistencies
that were later reported. Hessing et al. assert that their question
is equivalent to the question, "Did the government successfully
challenge the accuracy of either the income you reported or the
deductions you claimed?". However, if this question had in fact
been asked, the responses might have shown a much different relation
to government records. Kinsey (1988) notes that tax officials' lack
of knowledge about taxpayers' economic activities, as well as the
taxpayers' ignorance regarding IRS appeals procedures, both
contribute to discrepant reports. Kinsey's arguments cast doubt
upon the conclusion of Hessing et al. that respondents are siroply
lying (either by denying or by "boasting") about their tax evasion.
Contrary to the findings of Hessing et al. (1988) , there is
evidence that in many situations, self-reports of undesirable
9
behavior can be c^ite hor^t. HiMrelfarb and Uckteig (1982)
i-asur^ the proportions of acMissions to two of the behaviors of
interest in the c^t study (cheating and shoplifti^) amoi^
others, v^en the responses were ci^tained thm^ the randomized
response technique (RRT) and when they were obtained by dir^
questions, randomized response technique is a means of
iiicreasing subjects' willingness to answer questions truthfully by
insuring that the experimenter has no way of knowing a subject's
true answer to sensitive items on a questionnaire. Ihe RRT has been
shown to increase self
-reporting of socially undesirable behaviors
such as child abuse (Zdep & Rhodes, 1976) and dnig use among high
school students (Goodstadt & Gruson, 1975)
.
In Hijnmelfarb and Lidcteig's study, subjects were instructed to
answer "yes" to a self-report item if a toss of three coins came up
all heads, "no" if it came up all tails, and truthfully for all
other combinations. The proportion of truthful admissions to each
behavior is known (approximately 75% in Himmelfarb & Lickteig's
study)
,
even thoogti the e5^)erimenter does not know vs^iether any
particular response is truthful. Using a large group of subjects in
order to overcome error variance, the estimated proportion of
subjects truthfully admitting to each behavior was obtained and
compared with a different subject sample's anonymous responses to
direct questions (DQ) about the same behaviors. In this study,
79.3% (DQ) vs. 78.8% (RRT) admitted to having ever cheated and 71.2%
(DQ) vs. 68.2% (RRT) admitted to having ever shoplifted.
These results indicate that direct questioning with guaranteed
anonymity for the subjects can provide honest reports for the
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behaviors in c^estion. Acinissions to cheatii^ and shopliftii^
appear to represent honest resf^nses, not only because so irany
subjects adndt to these behaviors, but also because the differs
in admission rates in the RRT and DQ conditions is small. These two
behaviors were associated with hi^ negative social desirability in
the Himmelfarb and Lickteig study, which indicates that subjects
would tend to lie by saying they had not performed the behaviors.
The third behavior of interest in the present study, lying to get
out of class assignments, is probably also associated with negative
social desirability, but it seems doubtful that subjects would be
more likely to lie about this behavior than about the two others,
i^parently, most college student subjects in an anonymous situation
are willing to respond honestly to questions about undesirable
behaviors. Nevertheless, the accuracy of self-reports in the
present context is an iinportant consideration and was ejqjlored in a
pilot study.
Pilot Study
The design for the main studies required that the experimenter
be able to contact subjects for a follow-up questionnaire, and match
each subject's responses from both sessions. The need to provide
identifying information may appear to subjects to be a threat to
anonymity, and therefore may interfere with honest responding. A
pilot study was conducted to aid in the development of the
questionnaire for the main study, and to determine the best
procedure for obtaining honest responses to questionnaire items.
The pilot questionnaire assessed how many times a subject had
performed each behavior in the past year. Self-reported admissions
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of havii^ perfomed each of the behaviors teluded responses to
c^-ended questions regarding the methods used to perfom the
behavior and to avoid getting cau^t. Attitudes, subjec±ive norms,
and perceived behavioral control were assessed by 7-point scales.
For each behavior, subjects estimated prxportions of other college
students perfomiiig the behavior ("m the past year, v^t percentage
of students do you think have taken sanething fmn a store without
paying?") and social desirability ("l^pie would say they had used a
false excuse to get out of turning in a class assignment on time or
takijig an exam when they really hadn't" vs. "People would say they
hadn't used a false excuse to get out of turning in a class
assignment on time or taking an exam v*ien they really had")
. Open-
ended questions regarding subjects' perceptions of people v*io would
approve/not care about the subject performing the behavior,
advantages/disadvantages, and ease/difficulty of performing the
behavior were designed to assess beliefs about each behavior.
Caramon responses to these questions were translated into items on
the main questionnaire measuring normative beliefs, behavioral
beliefs and control beliefs (respectively)
. All of the items
regarding a particular behavior appeared together on the pilot
questionnaire. The behaviors were assessed in the same order for
all subjects: cheating, shoplifting, then lying.
The pilot study provided information on the subjects'
willingness to admit to the three behaviors under two conditions of
threat to anonymity. Each subject in the pilot study was asked to
write his or her name, address and phone number on a form attached
to the questionnaire indicating willingness to participate in a
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continuation of the study within the next few weeks. One group of
subjec±s was asked for address and phone number on the initial
cxDnsent form, and the other group found a separate page at the end
of the questionnaire ejq)laining the need for a second session and
requesting name, address and phone number. A three digit number was
marked on both the contact form and the main questionnaire to allow
for matching subjects' responses frcm the first and second
administration of the questionnaire (subjects in the pilot study
were not actually contacted for the second session) . If subjects
were concerned about the lack of anonymity, it was expected that
there would be fewer admissions to the behaviors for subjects v*io
gave identifying information before filling out the questionnaire,
and more subjects would decline to be recontacted after having
admitted to the behaviors. No such differences were found,
indicating that subjects were unaffected by threats to anonymity.
In addition, the frequency of admission to the behaviors indicated
that subjects were honestly r^xjrting their own activities. About
66% of the subjects admitted to cheating at least once in the past
year, 39% admitted to shoplifting at least once, and 57% admitted to
lying to get out of a class assignment at lea^t once. The
percentages are lower than those obtained by Himtnelfart* & Lickteig
(1982) under the RRT (79% admitted to cheating; 68% admitted to
shoplifting) , but the self-reports in the present study were
confined to behaviors in the past year, v^iile the Himmelfarb &
Lickteig items assessed behaviors over the subject's lifetime ("Have
you ever cheated on a test?")
.
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The results of the pilot study indicate that student subjects
are relatively honest in reporting socially undesirable behaviors,
even when aware that the experimenter could match their names with
their responses to the questionnaire.
14
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CHAPIER 2
STUDY 1
In Study 1, the validity of the theory of planned behavior
predicting intentions for socially undesirable behaviors
e^lored. in addition to the canponents of attitude, subjective
norms and perceiv«i behavioral control, a moral obligation corrponent
is hypothesized to contribute to prediction. Individual differences
in reasoned action tendencies are assessed as potential moderators
of the ability of the model to predict intention.
Methods
Subjects
A total of 146 college students (28 males, 118 females) were
recruited throu^ psychology courses to participate in Study l.
The subjects were between the ages of 17 and 30 (M = 19.6, 4
subjects did not report age)
.
Questionnaire
Subjects were recruited for a questionnaire study near the end
of the fall semester. The questionnaire assessed the canponents of
the theory of planned behavior (intentions, attitudes, subjective
norms, perceived behavioral control) , as well as moral obligation
with regard to each behavior. Direct measures of each of the
corrponents were obtained, and specific behavioral, normative and
control beliefs were also assessed, using results from the pilot
study in vMch beliefs were elicited using open-ended questions. In
addition, subjects were asked how many times they had performed each
of the behaviors in the previous 12 months.
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For the assessment of specific behavioral beliefs, separate
measures were cA^tained for behavioral evaluation and belief
strength. Each behavioral belief item (e.g. cheating on a test
or exam will save study time") was scored on a scale of
liJcely/unlikely ranging fran 1 to 7. The corresponding behavioral
evaluation item saving study time is: good - bad") was scored
on a seven point scale ranging frcsn -3 to +3. There were eleven,
seven, and ten belief-evaluation pairs for cheating, shoplifting,
and lying, respectively. The scores for each pair of items were
multiplied, and the products were summed, to obtain a belief-based
measure of attitude toward the behavior.
Normative beliefs were also assessed by pairs of items
representing a specific normative belief ("if i cheat on a test or
exam, my parents would: not care/disapprove") and motivation to
comply ("I care vdiether my parents approve or disapprove of my
cheating on a test or exam - very much/not at all) . Four item pairs
for cheating and lying, and five pairs for shoplifting were scored
frm 1 to 7, multiplied, and summed.
Control beliefs were assessed using only one item for each
belief ("In most of my exams, cheating is quite easy because I sit
near friends - true/false) vMch was scored on a -3 to +3 scale and
designed to measure beliefs about the situations that increase
personal control over the behavior in question, as well as the
likelihood that the situation will occur. For each of the three
behaviors, eight control belief items were summed.
A direct measure of attitudes was obtained by summing each
subject's responses to five evaluative semantic differential-type
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adjective pairs placed on seven-^x^int scales. Direct ir^sures of
subjective nonr^ and perceived control were each ir^asured by sun^
responses to four items for each behavior, and intention and moral
c^ligation were each measured by summed responses to three items.
All of the items for a particular behavior were presented
together, and the order in which the behaviors were presented was
counterbalanced. Within each behavior section, the behavioral self-
report item was presented before the predictor items for half of the
subjects and after the predictor items for the other half, although
the pilot study indicated no differences in rate of admissions to
the behaviors with regard to placement of the self-report item. The
direct measures for intention, subjective norms, and perceived
control were interspersed among the other item sets, which were
presented in the following order: attitudes, behavioral evaluations,
behavioral beliefs, motivation to comply, normative beliefs,
perceived control. The questionnaire items are organized for
presentation in Appendix A.
Subjects also completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (SOS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Appendix B) , the Spontaneous and
Reasoned Action Scales (SAS & RAS; Ajzen and Watters, 1988; Appendix
C), the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo & Petty, 1986;
Appendix D)
,
and the Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale (EIS; Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1977 ; ;^pendix E) . The four individual difference measures
were counterbalanced, and always followed the predictor items.
Procedure
Subjects carpleted the questionnaires in groups of 20 to 50,
near the end of the fall semester. Before filling out the
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^estionnaire, eac^ subject cx^rpleted a consent fom v^ich^ codai
witH a three-digit number. The consent fom also requested the
subject's address and 0.one number as an indication of interest in
participating in a continuation of the study v^ch was to be
conducted in the spring. Each subject returned the cons^t fom
before beginning the questionnaire, v^ch was coded with the same
three-<aigit number. Subjects were instnicted not to put their names
on the questionnaire itself, and that their responses would be kept
anonymous.
Results
Alpha reliability of measures
Alf±ia reliability coefficients were obtained separately for each set
of predictor items described above, and are presented in Table 1.
Coefficients for the direct measures (intentions, attitudes,
subjective noms, perceived control, moral obligation) ranged
between .66 and .90, and between .51 and .85 for the sets of belief-
based items. One attitude item and one general subjective nom item
were dropped aftex initial reliability results showed poor item-
total correlations for those items. (Closer examination indicated
that the wording of the items may have been confusing to the
subjects.)
Alfdia reliability coefficients for the five individual
difference scales ranged between .76 and .91. The SAS and RAS
coefficients are based on 20 and 11 items respectively, chosen after
a preliminary analysis to represent maximum internal consistency.
No clear differences emerged between the four EIS subscales when
18
r^iability and correlation analyses were performed on the separate
subsoales, so results for the cxmbined scale only will be reported.
Table 1
Al^ia reliability coefficients for origiml sanple (n = 146)
Intention
Attitude
Behavioral beliefs
Subjective norms
Normative beliefs
Perceived behavioral control
Control beliefs
Moral obligation
Individual difference measures
Spontaneous action
.83
Reasoned action
^76
Inpulsiveness
, 81
Need for cognition [91
Social desirability
.77
Cheating ShODliftinq Lvina
.87
.90
.85
.81
.84
.85
.51
.52
.55
.81
.73
.83
.79
.83
.85
.66
.78
.67
.70
.79
.74
.71
.78
.79
Correlations between measures
Correlations between the direct and belief
-based measures of the
attitude, subjective norm, and perceived control conponents for each
of the three behaviors are presented in Table 2. The attitude -
behavioral belief and subjective norm - nomative belief
coefficients ranged between .53 and .67, while the perxreived control
- control belief coefficients for cheating, shoplifting and lying
were .12 (not significant), .19, and .63, respectively. The items
used to assess control beliefs may have been confusing to the
subjects, and therefore responses to these items would be
19
Table 2
Correlations between direct and belief-based measures (n = 146)
Attitudes - behaviors beliefs ^^"^^3^^^"^ ^Subjective norms - normative beliefs .56* '55* '^7*
Perceived control - control beliefs .12 !i9* [I2*
Note.— An (*) denotes significance (p < .05).
unreliable, causing the lower correlations, ihis possibility will
be further ejqjlored in Study 2.
Table 3 displays the matrix obtained by intercorrelating all
direct measures, as well as behavioral self-report for each of the
three behaviors. All coefficients were significant, and ranged from
.15 to .79. In keeping with the theory of planned behavior,
intention is consistently the single best predictor of behavior.
Intercorrelations between the five individual difference
measures are presented in Table 4. Surprisingly, spontaneous action
is positively correlated with reasoned action, need for cognition,
and social desirability. All of the other significant correlations
are in the expected direction, but spontaneous action correlates
positively with every other measure.
Test of the theory of planned behavior
Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to determine the
pattern of prediction of intention by the direct measures of the
corrponents used in the study. (Previous studies have shown direct
measures to be equivalent or better predictors of intention than
belief-based measures.) Step 1 of the regression included the
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Table 3
Intercorrelations between direct measures for original sainple
C3ieating
Intention
I Att SN PBC
—
u1uuae
.67 —
ouujfcx^uivti noxiii
.34 .46 —
ttu.«.^jLvt3u (jonurox
.79 .65 .37 —
MOT^ 1 ohl 1 rf;^'f- "i on
.69 .64 .50 .66
Self-report of behavior
.69 .53 .20 .61
Shod ift 1 ncf
*
Att SN PBC
Att 1 tl
.78
. Jo
. 50 ~
ivS-L »_<t;XVt3Ll VJUIIUXIJX •7Q
• /9 .76 .39
MnT"a 1 ohl i o^'f" i on1 Iwl. ctx \JKJJL -L^^u L.-LV^1
1
• fO .71 .42 .61
Sel f—rennrt nf Vv^h^vior*
. /Hi . bU
. 25 .67
Lying
I Att SN PBC
Intention
Attitude
.53
Subjective norm .37 .39
Perceived control .75 .52 .35
Moral obligation .74 .67 .42 .64
Self-report of behavior .56 .33 .15 .48
Note.— All correlation coefficients are significant at the
level
.
Table 4
Intercorrelations between individual difference scale scores
SA
Spontaneous action
Reasoned action .35*
Iirpulsiveness .20* -.45*
Need for cognition .28* .37*
Social desirability .35* .40*
Note.— An (*) denotes significance (p < .05).
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components of the theory of reasoned action: measure of attitudes
and subjective norms. The perceived behavioral control component
from the theory of planned behavior was added in Step 2. step 3
added the moral obligation component, and the final step included
self-report of past behavior. The r^ts ar^ shown in Table 5.
Ihe results for Step 1 indicate that, for all thr^ behaviors,
subjective norm adds nothing to the prediction of intention beyond
what attitude can predict alone. Lew variance associated with this
component would be expected to result in restricted correlations.
However, the standard deviations for this component (coluirai 1 of
Table 7)
,
while generally lower than those for other predictors, are
Table 5
Hierarchical regressions predicting intention (n = 146)
Cheatina Intention<5
r b
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
.67 .65*
Subjective norm
.34 .04
Step 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
.67 .28*
Subjective norm
.34 -.02
Perceived behavioral control .79 .62*
Step 3 - Moral Obligation
Attitude
.67 .21*
Subjective norm .34 -.08
Perceived behavioral control .79 .52*
Moral obligation .69 .26*
Step 4 - Self-report of behavior
Attitude .67 .15*
Subjective norm .34 -.04*
Perceived behavioral control .79 .42*
Moral obligation .69 .20*
Self-report of behavior .69 .26*
continued, next page
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Table 5 (cxsnt.)
Shoplifting Intend- inng
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
Subjective norm
Step 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
Subjective norm
Perceived behavioral control
Step 3 - Moral Obligation
Attitude
Subjective norm
Perceived behavioral control
Moral obligation
Step 4 - Self-report of behavior
Attitude
Subjective nom
Perceived behavioral control
Moral c±)ligation
Self
-report of behavior
Lying Intentions
.78
.78*
.38
-.01 7R
. / o
.78
.44*
.38
-.02
.79
.46*
.83
.78 .25*
.38
-.05
.79 .40*
.75
.34*
.87
.78
.20*
.38
-.03
.79 .25*
.75 .30*
.74 .30*
.89
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
r b R
Attitude
.53 .39*
Subjective norm
.46 .26* .57
Step 2 - Theory Planned Behavior
Attitude
.53 .10
Subjective norm
.46 .19*
Perceived behavioral control .75 .64* .79
Step 3 - Moral Obligation
Attitude
.53 -.05
Subjective norm
.46 .08
Perceived behavioral control .75 .48*
Moral obligation
.75 .42* .83
Step 4 - Self-report of behavior
Attitude
.53 -.06
Subjective norm .46 .10
Perceived behavioral control .75 .41*
Moral ctoligation .75 .38*
Self-report of behavior .56 .20* .85
Note.— An (*) denotes significance (p < .05)
.
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not low enough to si^port this conclusion. Results for Step 2
indicate that, for cheating and lying, perceived behavioral control
contributes substantially to prediction of intention (R increases
from
.67 to .82 and from .57 to
.79). For shoplifting, perceived
control contributes less to the prediction of intention (R increases
from .78 to .83)
.
Results for Steps 3 and 4, for all three
behaviors, indicate that moral ciDligation and self-r^rt of
behavior contribute significantly, but not substantially, to- the
prediction of intention beyond the conponents of the model. The
correlations between these components and intention are high, thus,
low variance does not explain these results.
In addition, hierarchical regression analyses were carried out
with past behavior as the dependent variable and intention and
perceived control as predictors. This "postdiction" analysis was
performed in order to provide for caiparison with later prediction
of future behavior in Study 2. Final multiple correlation
coefficients for the three behaviors were .70, .76, and .57 (for
cheating, shoplifting, and lying, respectively) , and are displayed
in Table 14. The perceived control ccaiponent accounted for less
than one percent of the variance in each postdiction analysis.
Individual difference measures
To test for moderating effects of the individual difference
variables, hierarchical regression analyses were also performed
separately for each interaction between the predictors of the theory
of planned behavior and scores on the four individual difference
measures. Moral obligation, self-report of behavior, and the score
from the individual difference scale of interest were entered in
24
in
St^ 3 of the regression, and the intemction term was entered
St^ 4. For instance, the interaction between intention and
iirpulsiveness was c^tained by includir^ the product of the two
measures in the regression equation after the other predictors,
only one interaction term could be entered into the equation at a
time, because tiie regression procedure was limited by substantial
correlations between predictors.
mpulsiveness showed the greatest tendency to interact with the
predictors, with nine out of 12 interactions significant:
impulsiveness x attitude and impulsiveness x perceived control were
significant for all three behaviors, impulsiveness x self-report
interactions were significant for cheating and shoplifting, and the
impulsiveness x subjective norms interaction was significant only
for shoplifting.
Scores on the reasoned action scale showed significant
interactions with subjective norms and behavioral self-reports for
shoplifting, and with perceived control for lying. The spontaneous
action scale showed a significant interaction only with behavioral
self-report for shoplifting. Ihere were no significant interactions
with scores on the need for cognition scale.
To further examine the moderating effects of the individual
difference measures, the original regression analyses were repeated
twice for each measure, once using subjects scoring above the median
for that measure, and again with subjects v^o scored below the
median. Ihe results confirm the ej^^ectation frcm the pattern of
interactions obtained above that the impulsiveness scale is the most
interesting and effective in this context, and Table 6 presents
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Table 6
Multiple regression coefficients fnr- ck-^I^^ i
impulsiveness (q = 73)
"^""^"^^ subjects scoring high vs low on
Inpjlslveness
Cheating Tnt^nt1?n° ^ ^
Step 3 - TPB & Moral obligation ao
Step 4 - self-report
'H
Shoplifting intent inn«^
Step 3 - TPB & Moral obligation
.84
Step 4 - Self
-report
,87
Lvina Intenlj- j^ria
Step 3 - TPB & Moral obligation
.81
Step 4 - Self
-report
.83
.92
.93
.87
.88
multiple correlation coefficients for subjects who scored high and
low in iinpulsiveness. The intentions of subjects vy*io scored low in
impulsiveness tended to be more accurately predicted by the
components of the theory of planned behavior and moral obligation
than those who scored high in impulsiveness, while the median split
groups for the other individual difference measures showed less
consistent differences. For impulsiveness, the differences in
predictability of intention were small (.92 vs .80, .92 vs .04, and
.87 vs .81), but significant for cheating and shoplifting. When
self-report was added as a final step in these analyses, it
contributed slightly more to the final multiple g for subjects high
on iitpulsiveness than for those who were low in impulsiveness (see
Step 4 in Table 6) . This difference may be due to a more direct
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association between iinpulsiveness and actual behavior (by
definition, impulsiveness should act independently of intention) or
to a ceilir.3 effect of the already high coefficients obtained for
the low intention subjects.
Although impulsiveness appears to have some moderating effects,
no firm conclusions can be drawn with regarxi to the effects of the
other personality variables on the prediction of intention.
Considering the high level of prediction of intention already
obtained by the components of the theory of planned behavior, it is
not surprising that individual difference measures add little
predictive ability in this study.
Honestv of responding
Subjects' responses appeared to be relatively free fron social
desirability tendencies. Ihe most obvious support for this claim
comes from the high frequency and consistent reporting of socially
undesirable behaviors, in response to the behavioral self-report
questions on the questionnaire, 70% of the subjects admitted to
having cheated at least once in the past year, 36% admitted to
having shoplifted at least once, and 60% admitted to having used a
false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment
on time. The frequencies of the admissions are quite similar to
those obtained in the pilot study.
Further analyses were conducted to discover more subtle effects
attributable to social desirability responding. The initial
regression analyses were repeated with SDS score on the first step,
in order to hold effects of social desirability constant. In this
analysis, three to five percent of the variance was accounted for by
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social desirability (significant for all tiiree behaviors)
. Mor^
importantly, however, all effects reported prwiously rained
essentially the same and significant after controllii^ for the
effects of social desirability. The final multiple R values reached
.86 to .90, vs .85 to .89 for the regressions without adding SDS.
When SDS score was entered into the regression analysis after
the predictors of the theory of planned behavior, it contributed
significantly to the prediction of intentions for shoplifting and
lying. Interactions between SDS and subjective norms were
significant for all three behaviors, and SDS x attitudes for
cheating and SDS x self-report for lying were also significant.
Analyses on the two groups of subjects formed by a median split
on SDS scores showed that, as might be expected, prediction of
intentions was higher for subjects scoring high in social
desirability responding (.91, .92, .86 for cheating, shoplifting and
lying, respectively) than for those who scored low in social
desirability responding (.80, .88, .82). However, these differences
were significant only for cheating. Iherefore, subjects scoring
hi^ on social desirability showed some tendency to respond more
consistently than subjects with low social desirability tendencies,
but these tendencies were minimal.
In order to assess the effects of the placement of the self-
report item (at the beginning or end of each behavior section) , and
the sequence in v^ich the behaviors were presented, 2 (order) x 3
(sequence) multivariate analyses of variance were performed on self-
reports, intentions, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived
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control as dependent variables. There were no significant effects
of questionnaire order or sequence on subjects' responses.
Discussinn
Ihe results of study l show that social desirability factors had
a small and relatively uniinportant effect on the prediction of
intentions using the theory of planned behavior. This, as well as
the high rates of admission to the behaviors, suggest that subjects'
responses to questionnaire items were relatively honest and -
appropriate as a criterion measure of behavior.
The most important finding in Study l is the strong relation
between the predictors of the theory of planned behavior and
intentions to perform the target behaviors. The theory of planned
behavior appears to be no less effective in the prediction of
intentions for socially undesirable behaviors - cheating,
shoplifting and lying - than for other behaviors, as indicated by
hi^ multiple correlations conparable to those obtained in other
tests of the model (e.g. Schifter & Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & Madden,
1986)
.
The subjective norm conponent was not useful as a predictor
of intention. Subjective norms mi^t have been ejq^ected to play a
part considering the moral nature of the behaviors studied here, but
this was not the case. Examination of the standard deviations
associated with the measures of subjective norms rules out the
possibility of restricted correlations due to low variance, so other
explanations are needed to account for the lack of contribution of
the subjective norm conponent. Because of the secretive nature of
the target behaviors, subjects may often succeed in avoiding
negative social consequences of their behavior. They believe that
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such behaviors ar« generally l«*ed d»n upon, but are not directly
affected «hen their behaviors go undetected; it nay be for this
reason that ratings of nor^s are largely unrelated to actual
behavior.
The perceived behavioral control conponent added substantially
to the prediction of cheating and lying intentions, but less so to
the prediction of shoplifting intentions, and very little to the
postdiction of behavior. This may be simply a ceiling effect
resulting from the large contributions of predictors entered earlier
in the regression equation, or it may be a consequence of the type
of behaviors studied here. This question will be e5q)lored further
with results from Study 2.
Given the high proportion of variance already accounted for by
attitudes and perceived behavioral control, it is not surprising
that the moral obligation conponent did not substantially iitprove
prediction of intention, althou^ it did have a significant wei^t
in the equation. The sijnple correlations between moral obligation
and intention suggest that subjects were aware of and influenced by
moral issues, but the results of the regression show that the theory
of planned behavior was sufficient for the prediction of intention,
even for socially undesirable behaviors. These results do not
necessarily contradict those of Gorsuch and Ortberg (1983) , whose
regression equations did not include the perceived behavioral
control conponent of the theory of planned behavior. Presumably,
the proportion of variance accounted for by moral obligation in
their moral situations would be closer to the that in the present
study if the perceived control conponent had been included.
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Hie pattern of intercorrelations among the individual difference
measures showed an interesting inconsistency with regard to the
spontaneous action measure. The results suggest that the SAS and
RAS measures do not tap opposite tendencies, excqpt in correlations
with irrpulsiveness. In terms of irrproving prediction of intention,
inpulsiveness and social desirability show some usefulness as
moderator variables. However, the degree of iitprovement was small
and not consistently significant even for these. Since the *
prediction of intention from the ccstponents of the theory of planned
behavior was already close to the maximum permitted by the
reliability of the measures, the weak contribution of individual
difference measures is not surprising.
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CHAPTER 3
SIUDY 2
Introduce inn
A basic assunption of the theory of planned behavior is that the
best predictor of behavior is intention, v^ch, in tun., can be
predicted by attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral
control, intention is the direct antecedent of behavior, and for
behaviors under volitional control, intention leads to performance
of the behavior. However, intentions may change over time as a
result of changes m attitudes, subjective norms, or perceived
control, so measures of intention obtained before the changes will
have a weak relation to the ensuing behavior. Inconsistencies
between intention and behavior may therefore be due to limitations
in our ability to assess intention up to the moment the behavior is
performed.
Despite these limitations, there are practical and theoretical
reasons for wanting to predict behavior, rather than merely describe
its correlates after the fact. The potential value of being able to
predict behavior is illustrated by the topics of many previous
studies in the domain of the theories of reasoned action and planned
behavior, such as class attendance (Ajzen & Madden, 1986), voting
choice (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) , and tax evasion (Hessing et al.
1988)
.
Theoretically, a model ttiat only accounts for past behaviors
may face the problem of confounding between self-reports of
attitudes and behaviors due to the individual's motivation to appear
consistent. Conpared to ejqslaining the relationship between current
attitudes and past behavior, predicting behavior from prior
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information is more problematic and therefore a more stringent test
of the model.
In order to test the theory of planned behavior in prediction of
future behavior, a second study was carried out. Subjects v*io had
participated in Study 1 were reoontacted five to six months later
and returned to report on their behavior since the first
questionnaire session. The ability of the measures taken at the
first session to predict future behavior was then assessed. - A
strong relation between predictors and future behavior indicates the
validity of the model for prediction as well as e>planation.
Control subjects v^o did not fill out the initial questionnaire
corrpleted the second questionnaire at the same time as the "follow-
\jp" subjects. Control subjects' responses were obtained to discover
v^t, if any, effects the initial questionnaire had on responses to
the second questionnaire. For instance, sensitization to issues
regarding socially undesirable behavior may increase or decrease the
probability that an individual will engage in such behavior, or
admit to it. Similarly, the consistency of follow-up subjects'
responses may be influenced by their prior esqjerience with a similar
questionnaire, so results for the two groups are compared.
Ihe results of Study 1 showed only a limited effect of
individual difference variables as moderators of intention. Perhaps
stable dispositional factors cannot account for the variations in
intention studied in this context, and more situationally determined
variables have more influence. Therefore, Study 2 included measures
of the irxiividuals' involvement in each of the three issues.
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Ihere has been some evidence to show that reflection on one's
attitudes and issue involvement improve the relation between
attitudes and behavior. For instance, Snyder and Swann (1976) asked
subjects in a mock jury to reflect on their attitudes toward
affirmative action before delivering their verdicts in a
discrimination case. Ihe correlation between attitudes towarxl
affirmative action and verdict was hi<^er for those subjects than
for subjects v^o did not reflect on their attitudes. Further
evidence for the moderating influence of reflection has been
inconsistent, however. Wilson et al. (1984) showed the opposite
effect of reflection in three studies, as did Wilson and Dunn
(1986)
.
Evidence for the effects of issue involvement (or vested
interest) has been more uniform. Studies by Sivacek and Crano
(1982), Regan and Fazio (1977), and Fazio and Zanna (1978) support
the notion that involvement improves attitude-behavior consistency.
In order to test for these effects in the present context, measures
of "importance" were included in Study 2.
The individual difference measures that were relatively
successful as moderating variables in Study 1, impulsiveness and
social desirability, were included in Study 2. Although these
measures did not show substantial moderating effects for the
prediction of intention, they may be more relevant to the prediction
of actual behavior, especially inpulsiveness, v^ich is more directly
related to behavior than to intention.
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Methods
Subjects
Subjects who had participated in Study 1 and indicated that they
would be willijig to participate in a follow-up study were
recontacted the next semester for Study 2. Many of those contacted
were not currently enrolled in psychology classes, and therefore
were not interested in earning an experimental credit for
participating in a psychology study.
Of the subjects who had participated in Study 1, 34 returned for
the second phase. Forty-six control subjects who had not completed
the first questionnaire were also recruited.
Materials
The follow-up questionnaire consisted of the same direct
measures of intention, attitude, subjective norms, perceived
control, and moral obligation as on the initial questionnaire, and
excluded belief-based questions for the attitude and subjective norm
conponents. The self-report items for each behavior assessed
behaviors performed "in the past six months" in order to limit the
subjects' reports to performance since Study 1. Two new items were
included in the Study 2 questionnaire measuring the irrportance of
the behaviors for the subject (e.g. "Whether or not I take something
from a store without paying is an irrportant issue for me -
true/false")
. One item measuring thought was also included ("I have
thought a lot about cheating. . ."). The general predictor items
and the inportance items were scored on scales from 1 to 7.
Control belief assessment items from the first questionnaire
were modified in order to separate the belief and control values.
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confusion in rending to the canbined it^ may have been
responsible for the Ic^. correlations between cx^ntrol beliefs and
direct ineasures of perceived control in Study 1. Therefore, an item
frm Study 1 such as "In irost of my tests or exams, cheatmg is
quite easy because I sit near friends - true/false" was chained to
two items: "I usually sit frierxis in irost of iry tests or exan^
- tme/false" and "Sittii^ near friends durii^ a test or exam makes
cheating
- easy/difficult". The control belief items were scored
from 1 to 7. study 2 iirportance and control items are organized for
presentation in i?^pendix F.
As in Study 1, questionnaire order was counterbalanced with
regard to presentation of the three behaviors, and the self-report
items were located at the beginning of each behavior section for
half of the subjects and at the end of each section for the other
half. Precautions for anonymity were again carried out, with
returning subjects receiving questionnaires bearing the same 3-digit
number as on their first questionnaire, and control subjects
receiving questionnaires coded with a different series of digits.
Subjects' names did not appear on the questionnaires.
In addition to the questionnaire, control subjects also
completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale and the
Eysenck Iirpulsiveness Scale. Returning subjects from Study 1 did
not complete the SLJS and EIS.
Results
Reanalysis of Study 1 data for only the subjects v^o later
returned for the continuation study showed that the 34 subjects were
representative of the entire sample. The new sample was conposed of
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24% mles (cc^r^ to 19% in the initial sai^le)
, and the age
for the 34 subjects was 20.0 years (compared to 19.6) at the ti^ of
first testing. Self-reports of tehavior for cheating, shopliftir^g
and lying in the select saitple at Time 1 were slightly lower than
for the entire sample (56%, 32%, and 47% respectively, compared to
66%, 39% and 57%)
.
Self-reports frxM the select sairple at Time 2
equaled 47% for cheating, 29% for shoplifting, and 21% for lying.
In the control group, 48% admitted to cheating, 20% to shoplifting,
and 40% to lying to get out of a class assignment. The Time 2
behavioral admissions are quite a bit lower than those from Time 1
subjects, but the Time 2 questionnaire only asked for self-reports
of behaviors in the past 6 months, where the original questionnaire
had asked for self-reports in the past year.
Mean responses and standard deviations for the general predictor
items for the Time 1 subjects, the 34 returning subjects at both
Time 1 and Time 2, and the Time 2 control subjects are listed in
Table 7. Comparison of the means shows no sizable or systematic
differences across the four groups.
Reliability
Test-retest reliability coefficients for each of the predictors
of the model were obtained for responses from the 34 subjects on the
first and second questionnaire. Reliability coefficients ranged
from .53 to .83, with a mcdiem of .68; they are reported in Table 8.
AlfAia reliability coefficients for intentions, attitudes,
subjective norms, perceived control, and moral obligation on the
Study 2 questionnaire ranged from .72 to .92 for the 34 returning
subjects, and between .58 and .90 for the same 34 subjects in Study
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Table 7
Carparison of means (standaixi deviations) for main predictor items
Qieatina
Self-report
Intention
Attitude
Subjective norm
Perceived control
Moral obligation
Original sairple
1.74 (1.7)
10.30 (5.4)
11.24
8.43
(5.5)
(4.4)
15.10 (5.7)
7.70 (4.4)
Select sanple
Time 1
1.44 (1.7)
9.26 (5.8)
10.21 (5.9)
8.76 (4.7)
13.38 (5.9)
7.12 (4.0)
Time 2
.97 (1.5)
8.62 (5.5)
9.38 (5.0)
7.76 (4.5)
12.97 (5.7)
7.11 (3.9)
Control sample
.83 (1.2)
9.59 (5.0)
10.22 (5:2)
8.35 (4.7)
14.22 (6.0)
7.02 (4.5)
Shoplifting
Sel f-report
Intention
Attitude
Subjectivo rx)mi
PeroeivGd control
Moral obligation
Original sanple Select sample
Time 1
.99 (1.7) 1.00 (1.9) .82
7..89 (5.7) 7.21 (5.5) 7..88
9..54 (5.5) 9.52 (5.8) 9..79
6..52 (3.9) 7.06 (4.2) 6..67
12..00 (6.5) 10.94 (7.0) 10..65
6. 11 (4.3) 6.18 (4.3) 6..18
Time 2
(1.6)
(4.7)
(5.2)
(4.4)
(6.1)
(4.0)
Oontrol sanple
.54 (1.2)
8.00 (5.2)
9.46 (4.5)
6.74 (4.2)
12.78 (6.6)
5.74 (3.9)
Lying
Sel f-report
Intention
Attitixie
Subjective norm
Perceived control
Moral oblig.ition
Original sample
1.36 (1.6)
11.50 (5.4)
15.03 (6.1)
10.84 (4.9)
16.20 (5.7)
9.22 (4.9)
Select sample
Time 1
.97
9.06
13.94
10.33
14.90
8.06
(1.5)
(4.5)
(6.3)
(4.9)
(6.9)
(4.5)
Time 2
.53
9.50
13.23
11.00
14.74
9.53
(1.2)
(4.9)
(5.4)
(5.4)
(5.9)
(5.0)
Oontrol sanple
.84
10.70
14.78
10.56
16.59
9.59
(1.3)
(5.5)
(5.9)
(5.2)
(5.4)
(4.9)
Note.
—
Self-report data for the select sample at Time 2 and the
control sample are based on the past 6 months. Self-reports for the
Time 1 and original sample are based on the past 12 months.
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Table 8
Itest-retest reliability coefficients for select sanple (n = 34)
Cheatiiig Shopliftijig Lying
Self-report 74 ^_
intention [^l
-^8
^^^i^^
.60 66Subjective norm
.53 gn
'll
Perceived control
.70 '73
Moral (^ligation
.68 '75 'II
.75
1. Reliabilities for control belief items were
.21, .68 and .65 for
cheating, shoplifting, and lying, respectively. Alpha reliability
coefficients for the two iitiportance items ranged fram .69 to .92.
Alfte reliability coefficients for the 46 control subjects
ranged between .55 and .88 for the sets of predictor items, between
.14 and .53 for the sets of control belief items, and between .23
and .68 for the two inportance items. Alpha coefficients for the
select sample at both Time 1 and Time 2, and for the control
subjects at Time 2 are reported in Table 9.
Correlations
Intercorrelations between the predictor items were carried out
for the 34 returning subjects at Time 1 and Time 2, and for the
control subjects. These correlations appear to be relatively stable
across the three groi:ps, with some exceptions listed below.
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 10.
In keeping with the theory of planned behavior, intention was
the best predictor of behavioral self-report for all three
behaviors, except for the Time 2 returning and control subjects
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Table 9
Alpha reliability coefficients for select ana control samples
Cheating
Tiine 1 Time 2 control
Intention
Attitude
Subjective norm
Perceived control
Moral c±)ligation
Control beliefs
Iitportance
.90
.87
.88
.68
.58
.58
.90
.79
.91
.71
.71
.21
.75
.84
.77
.82
.55
.80
.53
.23
Shoplifting
Time 1 Time 2 Control
Intention
. 90
Attitude
. 84
Subjective norm .79
Perceived control .87
Moral obligation
.71
Control beliefs
.77
Iiiportance
.75
.79
.92
.76
.87
.67
.92
.86
.57
.78
.73
.86
.43
.68
Lying
Time 1 Time 2 control
Intention ,70
Attitude
.87
Subjective norm .88
Perceived control .86
Moral obligation .75
Control beliefs .79
Inportance
.80
.72
.91
.75
.85
.65
.69
.88
.80
.86
.64
.66
.14
.57
Note.— control belief reliabilities are based on summed items for
Time 1 data and on summed belief x evaluation products for Time 2
and Control subjects.
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responses for shcpliftir^. In toth of these cases, the ™,ral
^ligation oonponent was most highly correlated with self-report.
Ihe data also shc« a tendeixy for the ^jective norrs conponent
to be unrelated to the other predictors. Ihis tendency is
especially pronounce) for the retumi:^ subjects at Tire 2, anj for
lying.
Mjltiple recfressinn
Multiple regression analyses were performed on the data from the
34 follow-iQ. subjects to confirm the effectiveness of the theory of
planned behavior in predicting intention. Because of the small
number of subjects in Study 2, only two steps were included in the
regressions, step 1 included attitudes and subjective nonns as a
test of the theory of reasoned action, and Step 2 added perx:eived
behavioral control to test the theory of planned behavior. Ihe
results of these analyses for the three behaviors are reported in
Table 11.
For shoplifting and lying, the addition of the perceived control
component substantially inproved prediction of intention (R
increased from .73 to .84 and from .74 to .86). Perceived control
did not provide a substantial increase in prediction for cheating (R
increased from .79 to .81) . The multiple R's obtained after
entering the components of the theory of planned behavior in Study 2
(.81, .84, .86) are ccmparable to those obtained in Step 2 of Study
1 (.82, .83, .79).
Final multiple regression coefficients for the control group in
Study 2 were also high: .75, .81 and .79 for cheating, shoplifting
and lying, respectively (Table 12) . Perceived behavioral control
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Table 11
Hierarchical regression analysis for select sample at
Cheating Intentions
Time 2 (q=34)
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
Subjective nom
Step 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
Subjective nom
Perceived behavioral control
.78
.16
.78
.16
.72
.77*
.12
.55*
.10
.30
.79
.81
Shoplifting Intentinng
R
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
Subjective nom
Step 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
Subjective nom
Perceived behavioral control
.70
.20
.70
.20
.81
.70*
.19
.26
.13
.61*
.73
.84
Lying Intentions
R
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
.74 .73*
Subjective nom
.31 .02 .74
Step 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
.74 .48*
Subjective nom
.31 -.01
Perceived behavioral control .76 .52* .86
Note.
— An (*) denotes significance (p < .05).
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Table 12
Hierarchical regression analysis for control sample (n=46)
Cheating Intentions;
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
Subjective norm
Step 2 - Iheory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
Subjective norm
Perceived behavioral control
Shoplifting Intentinng
Step 1 - Iheory of Reasoned Action
Attitude
Subjective norm
St^ 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
Subjective norm
Perceived behavioral control
Lying Intentions
r b R
.67
.57*
.48
.24*
.71
.67
.44*
.48
.12 •
.64
.34*
.75
r b R
.69
.59*
.49
.23
.72
.69
.30*
.49
.15
.75 .49*
.81
Step 1 - Theory of Reasoned Action
r b
Attitude
.66 .62*
Subjective norm
.37 .09
Step 2 - Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude
.66 .40*
Subjective norm
.37 .04
Perceived behavioral control .70 .50*
R
.66
Note.
— An (*) denotes significance (p < .05).
made a significant contribution in each case. Therefore, Study 2
supports the evidence obtained in Study 1 that the theory of planned
behavior is sufficient for the prediction of intention.
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Ihe prediction of actual behavior was assessed by hierarchical
regressions in v^ch the 34 follow-.^ subjects' Time 2 self-reports
of behavior since the first questionnaire were regressed onto their
Time 1 reports of intention and perceived control. In other words,
intentions and perceived control at Time l were used to predict
subsequent behavior. The results of this analysis are reported in
Table 13. The best prediction was c^tained for cheating (final
multiple R = .74)
,
vMle the variance in shoplifting and lyiiig was
accounted for in itiuch smaller degrees (final multiple R's = .47 and
.35, respectively)
.
ihis may be at least partly due to the relative
instability of self-reports and intentions for shoplifting and
lying. While self-reports of cheating had a test-retest reliability
coefficient of .74, the other two behaviors had reliabilities of .67
and .68 for shoplifting and lying, respectively. Itest-retest
correlations of intentions were .83 for cheating, and .72 for both
shoplifting and lying. In order to compare the regression
coefficients without reliability limitations, the intention - self-
report correlations were corrected for attenuation, resulting in
correlations of .95, .67, and .50 for cheating, shoplifting and
lying. Even when the effects of reliability are controlled,
differences in the intention - self-report relation are still
substantial. This suggests that, for the most part, differences in
the prediction of self-report are due to factors other than
reliability limitations.
For predicting the behaviors at Time 2, perceived behavioral
control made no significant contributions, indicating that this
corponent was already included in intention, or that it was not
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Table 13
Self-r^rt of cheating
St^ 1
Intention
Step 2
Intention
Perceived behavioral cxantrol
.66
Self-report of shoplifting
Self-report of lying
.74
.74*
.74 .65*
.11 .74
Step 1
Intention
.47
Step 2 '^^
Intention
.47 4^
Perceived behavioral control [42 ]o5 47
R
Step 1
Intention
.35 ^35* 35Step 2
Intention
.35 30
Perceived behavioral control
.29 .08 .35
Note.
—
An (*) denotes significance (p < .05).
sufficiently related to actual control to contribute to prediction.
Smilarly, perceived control did not consistently account for
variance in past behavior.
"Postdiction" analyses were conducted using Time 2 predictor
measures and self-report of past behavior (see Table 14) . For the
returning grci:^, final multiple regression coefficients were .85,
.68, and .50 for cheating, shoplifting and lying, respectively.
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Table 14
Regression coefficients for Dost-riir+ir^«
146) select (n - -^a^ ^ analyses on original (nj-^b;
,
- 34) , and control (n = 46) samples
Original sample
Self-r^rt
Cheating shool i fti ng t y-i rv^
Intention
Perceived behavioral control
.69
.70
.74
.76
.56
.57
Select Sample - Time 1
Self-report
Intention
Perceived behavioral control
Cheating Shoplifting Lying
.81
.82
.77
.77
.50
.50
Select sample - Time 2
Self
-report
Intention
Perceived behavioral control
Cheating Shoplifting Lying
.83
.85
.59
.68
.50
.50
Control sample
Self-report
Intention
Perceived behavioral control
Cheating Shoplifting Lying
.70
.70
.54
.56
.57
.57
Note.
— Intention was entered in Step 1 of the regression equation,
and perceived control was entered in Step 2.
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Perceived behavioml cx^ntrol c^ntrtoted significantly to reports of
cheating and shcplifting behaviors (accounti^ for 4% and 11% of the
variance)
.
For the control group, final coefficients were
.70, .56
and
.57. Perceived behavioral contrxDl made no significant
contributions in this group, study l postdiction analyses, it will
be recalled, showed a significant contribution of perceived control
(accounting for 2% of the variance) for shcplifting, and no
significant effects for the other two behaviors.
Control Beliefs
Ihe summed products of the reworded control belief items showed
generally higher reliability cortpared to the original items in Study
1, but the pattern of reliability coefficients indicates some
instability. Alfto reliability for cheating contrxDl beliefs was .21
for the 34 returning subjects, and .53 for the control subjects.
Conversely, reliability for the lying items was .65 for the
returning subjects and .14 for the control subjects. Ihe
correlations between the control belief products and the sum of the
four general perceived control items ranged between -.15 and .55 for
the returning subjects, and between .01 and .27 for the control
group. In order to verify that these inconsistencies were all
attributable to problems with the specific belief items, and not to
the general items, multiple regression analyses were performed using
the summed control belief products in place of the general perceived
control items in predicting intention. Ihe results confirmed that
the general perceived control items were more useful in predicting
intention than the specific beliefs.
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Individual differpnoe ineaRiir,:.^
HiemrcOiical regression analyses predicting intention fm^m
attitude, subjective nonns, aixi pert^eived control wer^ perfonned
separately for subjects above and below the median on the
impulsiveness and social desirability scales. No consistent
patterns were observed in the regressions for control subjects or
for the 34 Tijne 1 subjects who later returned for the follow-up.
Similarly, no consistent patterns emerged when regressions '
predicting Time 2 self-reports fran Tijne 1 intentions and perceived
control were performed on the ir^edian split groups. The instability
of these effects in the prediction of intention is not too
surprising in light of the small effects that were observed for
these measures originally. More surprisingly, the expectation that
impulsiveness would have a more substantial effect on actual
behavior was not supported by the results of the prediction of self-
reports.
In order to test for moderating effects of importance and
thought on the prediction of intention and behavior, separate
regressions were performed for subjects who were above and below the
median on these measures, predicting intention for the control and
follow-up data, and predicting Time 2 self-report from the initial
data of the follow-up subjects. Ihere were no clear patterns of
differences in prediction of intention for subjects viho scored above
and below the median on involvement and amount of thought. However,
in the control groip, prediction of intention was significantly
improved with low scores on iitportance, for cheating and
shoplifting.
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Discussinn
Ihe results of study 2 i^Jicate that intention can pmiict
future undesirable behavior, esp^iaiiy ci^eati:^. Shoplifti,^, and
lying were less well predicted over a six nonth period. Self-report
and intention retest reliability coefficients for these two
behaviors were slightly lover than for cheati^, indicatir^ that the
behaviors themselves my be less stable, and that intentions of
perfonning the behaviors changed more for shoplifting and lying than
for cheating, ihe small differences in reliability did not fully
account for the larger differences in prediction, however, other
factors such as opportunity may have played an iitportant role in the
perfonnance of the behaviors - perhaps subjects have difficulty
judging in advance whether the opportunity, need, or desire to
shoplift or lie to a teacher will occur. PerxDeived behavioral
control did not contribute to the prediction of future behavior, or
to postdiction of past behavior, indicating that this factor had
been fully accounted for in the intention component, and did not
provide further infonnation about actual control.
Control beliefs were examined more closely in this study than in
Study 1, yet were still found to be less reliable than other
components, and inconsistently related to general reports of
perceived control. This instability, also observed in Study 1, may
represent an iitportant and interesting difference between socially
undesirable behaviors and the more acceptable behaviors previously
studied. Apparently, specific control beliefs are not as ijtportant
with rcjgard to these behaviors or their conponents as might be
expected. It is possible that in sampling control beliefs in the
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pilot study, subjects were respondir^ to situational demands in
reporting beliefs, although such beliefs wer^ not important with
regard to actual cheating behavior. Specific control beliefs my
have been overshadowed by attitudes and general perx^eptions of
control for these behaviors. Alternatively, the behaviors studied
here may be constrained by very specific situational factors,
interacting in ways that are difficult to measure, ihis supposition
seems ijtprobable given the high rate of perfonnance of the -
behaviors, but there is a possibility that each instance of a
behavior is marked by a different set of control factors.
No consistent moderating effects of individual difference
variables (iinpulsiveness and social desirability), or secondary
attitude characteristics (importance and thought) were found in this
study. The effects of importance on prediction of intentions for
cheating and shoplifting in the control group, however, are
significant, and in the opposite direction to that expected, given
previous research findings (e.g. Sivacek & Crano, 1982) which
suggest that increased involvement should improve attitude-behavior
consistency. Despite this inconsistency, the results reported here
are so unstable (occuring only for two behaviors in the control
group) that they pose little threat to the conclusion that
involvement usually inproves prediction. The results from the
analyses of inportance and thought, as well as the other individual
difference variables point instead to the robust prediction of
intention and self-report that is achieved by the theory of planned
behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary
Study 1 demonstrated the utility of the theory of planned
behavior in accounting for intentions to engage in socially
undesirable behaviors. While the subjective nonns component did not
contribute significantly to the pr^ction of intention, moral
dDligation received a significant wei^t in the prediction of
intention, but added little to the variance already accounted for by
the components of the theory of planned behavior. Individual
difference measures related to tendencies toward reasoned and
spontaneous action were found to have mininal or no moderating
effect on prediction.
The main emphasis of Study 2 was on the prediction of actual
behavior, and the findings indicated a significant relationship
between intention and behavior over a six month period. Perceived
control did not contribute to behavioral prediction, and contributed
only minimally to postdiction.
For all Study 1 subjects and for follow-up subjects and new
(control) subjects in Study 2, attitude and perceived behavioral
control accounted for nearly all of the reliable variance of
intentions to cheat, shoplift, and lie. The subjective norms
component was uniformly ineffective in predicting intention
throu(^out both studies. In the most stringent test of the theory,
intention at Time 1 was hi^ily correlated with behavior reported at
Time 2 for cheating (R - .74) . Although the prediction was
substantially less for shoplifting and lying, (R's = .47 and .35),
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these results are nevertheless statistically significant and
indicate the potential practical i^rt^ for predicting dishonest
behavior.
Perceivec^ ron^>-r^i
Ihe findings raise an interestii^ question r^garxiing the lack of
relation between control beliefs am the other components pmiicting
intention and socially undesirable behavior. Further investigation
may reveal the nature of this inconsistency, and confirm the' role of
specific control beliefs. Salient control beliefs for these
behaviors my vary widely across individuals, in which case it may
be necessary to elicit each subject's beliefs separately.
Alternatively, specific control beliefs may prove to be almost
unrelated to intentions to perform socially undesirable behaviors,
as individuals Oio perform the behaviors may ignore or suppress
cognitive estimations of their control in immoral or illegal
situations.
Another possible explanation of the instability of the control
beliefs and the lack of contribution of the perceived control
component lies in the hypothesis discussed earlier, that shoplifters
(and possibly cheaters and liars as well) perceive deterrent
measures as challenges (Weaver & Carroll, 1985) . Related to this
notion, there is evidence that criminals perceive an optimal level
of risk, and levels of risk above or below this level decrease their
desire to commit the act (Kallis & Vanier, 1985) . This inplies a
curvilinear relationship between risk perceptions and intention for
ejqDerienced cheaters, shoplifters, and liars, \4iich may affect the
predictive ability of the perceived control ccaiponent.
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Following this reasoniiig, the differences in pr^ction of self-
reports Of the three behaviors in this study may be due to subjects'
differing abilities to foresee situations in v^ch they would be
likely to perform each behavior. Shc^liftii^ and lying behaviors
may depend largely on perceptions of risk and cpportunity that
cannot be evaluated until the situation arises. On the other hand,
cheating takes place in a generally predictable environment, and
subjects may be able to predict their cheating behavior ahead of
tiine. The motivation to perform under a certain amount of risk may
not apply for cheating behaviors perhaps because it is generally
easy to avoid detection v^le cheating, or because cheating is not
generally associated with criminal charges as in shoplifting, or
with direct social interaction as in lying to a professor.
Implications
The present studies indicate that the theory of planned behavior
provides a useful means of predicting socially undesirable behavior.
Ihe results have inplications for numerous issues involving
undesirable behavior, such as the development of persuasive
coraraunications, but are most directly applicable to issues of
behavioral prediction, such as the current problem in honesty
testing for eirployment.
Since the recent federal ban on polygraph pre-enployment
testing, many enployment screening professionals are turning to
paper and pencil integrity tests to predict undesirable behavior
such as stealing and drug use in potential employees (Bales, 1988)
.
Suspicions of unsound methodology and invalidity of many of these
tests have led to concerns among the psychological community, and
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paper and pencil integrity test pn^itions have been added to
anti-polygraph laws in Massachusetts and Rhode Island and ar^ being
considered in other states. While it is pnxient to restrict the use
of ijwalid or untested scales, especially in making iitportant
decisions, there is a need for valid pr^ction of undesirable
behavior in the workplace. Instead of lobbying for more
restrictions on honesty testing, psychologists should begin to take
a practical interest in employment screening issues. The research
reported above is an initial indication of a solution to the problem
of predicting employees' undesirable behaviors. Translating the
theory of planned behavior into an appropriate fonnat for pre-
employment screening, would require a means of overcoming problems
of dishonest responding v^ich were negligible in the nonthreatening
situation of the present studies, ihe application of advances in
behavioral prediction to more practical problems is still out of
reach, but the research reported here represents an initial step in
that direction.
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APPENDIX A
STUDY 1 QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
Cheating Jtpm^
Intixduction
Most college students are familiar with the concept of cheatingThere are many ways to cheat, and cheating occC^L L^^"^"^*
situations. We are interested in your feelings about cheating ontests or exams. Please answer each question honestly.your responses are anonymous. i^tuifcaiiuer,
Self-report
In the last 12 months, how many times have you cheated on a test orexam? (circle one)
never once twice 3 times 4 times 5 times more than 5times
Attitude
For me, cheating on a test or exam is
good 1
pleasant 1
wise 1
useful 1
attractive 1
harmful 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
2 3 4 5 6 7 unpleasant
2 3 4 5 6 7 foolish
2 3 4 5 6 7 useless
2 3 4 5 6 7 unattractive
2 3 4 5 6 7 beneficial
Intention
If I had the opportunity, I would cheat on a test or exam.
true 12 3 4 5 6 7 false
I would never cheat on a test or exam.
true 12 3 4 5 6 7 false
I may cheat on some of my tests or exams in the future.
true 12 3 4 5 6 7 false
Subjective Norms
If I cheat on a test or exam most of the people v*io are important to
me would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
No one who is iitportant to me would think it is ok for me to cheat
on a test or exam.
agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disagree
Most of the people v^o are inportant to me think it is ok for me to
cheat on a test or exam.
liJcely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
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T^tL'T^'^lr ^ - -ill l-'^ <^-n on n« if I
'"^'^ 12 3 4 5 6 7 unliKely
Peroeived Behavioral f>.ntT-1
For me to cheat on a test or exam is
easy 12341;
If I want to, I can cheat on a test or exam
^
'
difficult
^® 1 2 3 4 5 6 7fl
Wt^lilSl'^r ' ""^'^ « a test or exa™ eveTif I
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
^ o™^ ' 1 "^-If to cliSt^i'a
'^ly 12 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
I would not feel guilty if I cheated on a test or exam.^^.12 3 4 5 6 7 falseCheating on a test or exam goes against ray principles.
T^^^^^vJ , 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikelyIt would be morally wrong for me to cheat on a test or examl^ly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 uAlikely
Behavioral evaluatior)
My getting a good grade on a test or exam is
9°°^ 1234567 bad
Learning ray class material is
good 1234567 bad
Hurting ray future ccu^eer is
good 1234567 bad
My saving study time is
good 1234567 bad
My getting into the habit of cheating is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My getting caught cheating on a test or exam is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
Forgetting something I studied during a test or exam is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My passing a course instead of failing is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
Losing confidence in ray abilities is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
Getting a better grade than I deserve is
good 1234567 bad
Checking whether ray answers on a test or exam are correct is
good 1234567 bad
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Behavioral Beliefs
iL^i?^' T ' T"' ' ''''' mterS!^'"
5^eati^^on a test or exam will hurt^ futL carL.
"^"^"'^
My cheating on a test or exam will save\tudy time ^
^iJ^ely
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cheating on a test or exam could become a habit. ^
unlikely
likely 1 2 3 4 5 e 7 tvi
If I cheat on a test or exam I mi^t get cauqht
unlikely
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6* 7 Tvi
^tir^ on^a test^or exam could^help it^ recall sc^^thi,^ ^i^S.
Cheating on a test or exam can help me pass a course insteS^^^^
railing.
^i^^y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikelyIf I cheat on a test or exam I will lose confidence in myselflikely 1 2 3 4 R c -71-1.
T€ T iv,^^^- 4- ^ . ° 7 unlikelyIf I cheat on a test or exam I will get a better grade than Ideserve.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikelyBy cheating on a test or exam I can check whether my answers are
correct
likely 12 3
Motivation to comply
7 unlikely
I care v^ether my classmates approve or disapprove of my cheating on
a test or exam.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
I care whether my parents approve or disapprove of ray cheating on a
test or exam.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
I care whether my professor approves or disapproves of my cheating
on a test or exam.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
I care v^ether my friends approve or disapprove of my cheating on a
test or exam.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
Normative Beliefs
If I cheat on a test or exam, most of my classmates would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I cheat on a test or exam, my parents would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I cheat on a test or exam. ray professor would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I cheat on a test or exam. most of ray friends would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
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Control beliefs
In most of iny tests or exams, people are sitting closely enou^
together so that I cx>uld cheat if I wanted to.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
The amount of si^^ervision in most of my tests or exams makes it haid
for me to cheat.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In most of ray tests or exams, the class size would make it easy for
me to cheat.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Ihe respect I have for most of my professors would make it hard for
me to cheat on a test or exam.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In most of my tests or exams, the test forms used make it harder to
cheat.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In most of ray tests or exams, cheating is quite easy because I sit
near friends.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In roost of ray tests or exams, it is easy to cheat because the
professor doesn't care.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In most of iry test or exams, it is easy to cheat because books or
papers are left out.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
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ShODlifhi nq T1-om<=
Introduction
Mdng sanethijig frcm a store without payiiig for it is aninterestii^ behavior about vhich lituHs known. We v^d liXe tofind out how pecple feel about taking sansthing frem a^^e ^^t
^^^^""^^ ^* honestly?' Remenfc^ ^responses are anonymous.
Self-report
In the last 12 months how many times have you taken sonething froma store without paying? (circle one)
never once twice 3 tinies 4 times 5 times more than* 5 times
Behavioral evaluation
My saving money is
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 badGetting something I need and can't afford is
- L- ^ . ^ ^ 5 6 7 badMy doing something exciting is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
My getting into the habit of taking something from a store without
paying is
good 1234567 bad
My outsmarting store owners and enployees is
good 1234567 bad
1^ getting cau^t taking something from a store without paying is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My causing prices of merchandise to rise is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
Behavioral Beliefs
If I take something from a store without paying I will save money,
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
If I take something from a store without paying I can get something
I need and would not be able to afford otherwise,
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
TaJcing something from a store without paying could be exciting,
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
Taking something from a store without paying could become a habit,
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
If I take something from a store without paying, I would outsmart
the store owners and enployees.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
If I take scanething from a store without paying, I will get cau<^t.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
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S^r^ ^ ^^^^ "^1^ Pri- Of
'"^'^ 12 3 4 5 6 7 unlixely
Motivation to comply
I care whether store owners approve or disapprxuve of my takinasomething from a store without paying. ^
T:aKi g
very much 12345^^
Icare v^ether my parents apprx^e or disapprove of my taJdS
something from a store without paying.
^J^-mg
very much 1 2 3 4 *5 e
I care whether my friends approve or disapprove of my taki^
somethuig from a store without paying.
very much 1 2 3 4*5 g ^ not- atI care v^ether the police approve or disapprove of my taJd^'^ ^
something from a store without paying.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 g 7 not at allI care whether store employees approve or disapprove of my takinq
something from a store without paying.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
Normative Beliefs
If I take something from a store without paying, the store owners
would
not care 12 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
It I take something from a store without paying, my parents would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I take something from a store without paying, my friends would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I take something from a store without paying, the police would
not care 1,2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I take something from a store without paying, store eitployees
would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
Control Evaluations
Usually, the number of store enployees around would make it
difficult to takB something from a store without paying,
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Usually, the presence of mirrors in the store makes it difficult to
take something without paying.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
The security systems in most stores make it difficult to take
something without paying.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Ihe presence of security guards in most stores makes it difficult to
take something without paying.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
The number of customers in most stores makes it easy to take
scanething without paying.
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22 ^^t.%iZl'^y1^^ ^""^^ to take it frcM
true 2 3 4 5 g
^K^tSL?^!" difflLlt'Slate
true 1 2 3 4 5 gThe^ze of WDSt stores makes it easy to take something wiSSt
'
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
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Lvim Items
Introduction
False excuses can be used in many circumstances: to get out of a
social engagement or avoid admitting a mistate, for instance inthis part of the questionnaire, we want to know your feelings about
using false excuses to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time. Please answer each question honestly.
Pemonber, your responses are anonymous.
Self-report
In the last 12 months, how many times have you used a false excuse
to get out of taking a test or turning in a class assignment- on
time? (circle one)
never once twice 3 tijnes 4 times 5 times more than 5
times
Behavioral Evaluations
My getting more time to study or work on an assignment is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My getting better grades is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
My getting into the habit of using a false excuse to get out of
taking a test or turning in an assignment on time is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
Getting to do scsnething I enjoy instead of taking a test or doing an
assignment on is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My taking a make-up test or doing a make-up assignment that is more
difficult than the original is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My getting information about a test or assignment from others is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
Ihe professor not believing me v*ien I have a real excuse is
good 1 2 3 4 567 bad
My getting behind on future assignments is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
My appearing to be irresponsible is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
Ihe professor not believing my false excuse is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
Behavioral beliefs
If I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time, I will get more time to study or work on the
assignment.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
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likely i 2 3 4 5 ^ ^ ,
If I use a false excuse to get out of takinrr Vo.^ 4-
"^^^^^
a^^t on ti^^X will^glt to^L°L^\SV.^ SS^^o" ^
If I use a false exca^ to get c^t of tLi^ a'test or turSjfS^anapiTO on time the n«ke-up test orlS^t my™J^
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unllkelIf I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in^anassignment on time I could get infonnation about the tes^^J-
assignment from others.
I^'us..li ' ' ^ ^ 7 likelyf I u e a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in anassignment on tune the professor won't believe me later when I have
a real excuse.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikelyUsing a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time will result in my getting behind for future
assignments.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
Using a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time will make me appear irresponsible.
l^^y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikelyIf I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time, the professor might not believe me.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
Motivation to comply
I care v^ether my classmates approve or disapprove of my using a
false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment
on time.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
I care v^ether my professor approves or disapproves of ray using a
false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment
on time.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
I care whether my friends approve or disapprove of my using a false
excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on
time.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
I care whether ray parents approve or disapprove of ray using a false
excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on
time.
very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
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Norroative Beliefs
If I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time, ray classmates would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprxjve
If I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
cissignment on tune, my professor would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on tiirie, iny friends would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprove
If I use a false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an
assignment on time, iry parents would
not care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disapprwe
Control Beliefs
It is easy for me to use a false excuse to get out of taking a test
or turning in an assignment on time because I know most of ray
professors.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Ihe leniency of most of rny professors makes it easy for me to use a
false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment
on time.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
ability to make up a good story makes it easy for me to use a
false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment
on time.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
The need to provide proof makes it hard for me to use a false excuse
to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on time,
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Being a good actor makes it easy for me to use a false excuse to get
out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on tinne because I
am a good actor.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
It would be more difficult for me to use a false excuse to get out
of taking a test or turning in an assignment on time because it
would probably be all ray fault for not being prepared,
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Having scanething iirportant to do often makes it easy for me to use a
false excuse to get out of taJdjig a test or turning in an assignment
on tiine.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
It would be difficult for me to use a false excuse to get out of
taking a test or turning in an assignment on time because ray work
would pile up.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
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APPENDIX B
MARIiDWE-CRDWNE SOCIAL DESIRABinTTY SCAIfil
^^S^,^^"^^^^ f "^^^ °f statements concerning personalattitudes and traits. Read each item a«a decide^^X
statement is true or false as it pertains to you persoml^!
T F I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone introuble.
T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if- 1 am
not encouraged.*
T F
T F
T F
I have never intensely disliked anyone.
On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in
life.*
I sometimes feel resentful vrtien I don't get ray way.*
T F I am always careful about my manner of dress.
T F My table manners at home are as good as v^en I eat out in a
restaurant.
T F If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was
not seen, I would probably do it.*
T F On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because
I thou^t too little of my ability.*
T F I like to gossip at times.*
T F There have been times v*ien I felt like rebelling against
people in authority even though I knew they were right.*
T F No matter v*io I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
T F I can remember 'playing sick' to get out of scanething.*
T F Ihere have been occasions v^en I took advantage of someone.*
T F I'm always willing to admit it v^en I make a mistake.
T F I always try to practice vtot I preach.
T F I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with
loud mouthed, obnoxious people.
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forget.
^tiines try to get even, rather than forgive and
T F^^ When I don't know somethii^ I don't at all mind admitting
F I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
^^
At times I have really insisted on having things my own
F Ihere have been occasions when I felt like smashing thiiigs.*
F I would never thijik of letting someone else be punished for
wrongdoiiigs.
T
T
T
T
T F I never resent being asked to return a favor.
T F I have never been irked v^ien people ejqjressed ideas very
different from my own.
T F I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my
car.
T F Ihere have been times v^en I was quite jealous of the good
fortune of others.*
T F I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
T F I am sometimes irritated by people v*io ask favors of me.*
T F I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
T F I sometimes think v*ien people have a misfortune they only
got what they deserved.*
T F I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's
feelings.
Starred items are reverse scored.
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APPENDIX C
PEASONED AND SPC»TIANEOUS ACTION SCALESl
Reasoned Action .qnP>io
When filling out fontis (an application fom, for exainple) icarefully read the instructions before fillip in^bla;!]^.
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
Most people I know are better organized than I am.*
I am generally on time for appointments.
I try to wei^ all the pros and cons before making a decision.
I keep a careful record of ray expenses.
I usually have assignments ready on tijne.
I generally am a logical person.
Once I have made a plan, I tend to follow it to its cotpletion.
I normally avoid working on projects that require a great deal of
planning and preparation.*
I have a tendency to act without thinking about the consequences.*
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Spontanfymg tr-t-jpn srj,if^
I tend to waver back and forth before makii^ an Mportant decision.
I have to work at being spontaneous.
to be more enthusiastic about things than the average
^nv S^i^^H^ the last few years over again, I wouldn't changemany of the things I have done.* ^
I have a hard time making friends.
I have no clear idea of vAiat ray life will be like 10 year^ from now.
I have sometijTves missed out on opportunities because I couldn't make
vap iry mind.
When it comes to trusting other people, I can usually rely on my out
feelings.* ^
I find it difficualt to put the reasons for ray actions into words.
I usually say v^t is on my mind.*
In most situations, I know that vtot I am doing is ri(^t.*
Candidates for political office all tend to look alike to me.
I just know intuitively v^en to take a dhance and vAien to avoid it.*
When necessary, I can be very assertive.*
I usually trust my instincts v*ien deciding on a new course of
action.*
I tend to avoid activities that involve risk or danger.
I generally know v*iat I want out of life and how to get it.*
I usually sense ri^t away v^ether a person is trustworthy or not.*
I typically keep my feelings to myself.
^ Items are scored from 1 to 5. Starred items are reverse scored.
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APPENDIX D
NEED FOR O0GNinC»J SCAI£l
I would prefer ccfnplex to simple prx^blems.
I like to have the responsibility of handliiig a situation thatrequires a lot of thinicing.
^xu ai^i zn z
Hiinking is not iny idea of fun.*
I would rather do something that requires little thought than
something that is sure to challenge iny thinking abilities.*
I try to anticipate and avoid situations v^ere there is likely
chance I will have to think in depth about scxnething.*
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
I only think as hard as I have to.*
I prefer to think about small, daily projects than long-term ones.*
I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.*
The idea of relying on thou^t to make my way to the top appeals to
me.
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to
prc±)lems.
learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.*
I prefer ray life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
Ihe notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and inportant
to one that is somevdiat irrportant but does not require much thought.
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after conpleting a task that
required a lot of mental effort.*
It's enou^ for me that something gets the jc±> done; I don't care
how or v^y it works.*
^ Items were scored on a 1 (agree) to 7 (disagree) scale. Starred
items were reverse scored.
Due to a printing error, one item (not shewn) was not included on
the questionnaire.
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APPENDIX E
EYSENCK IMFUISIVENESS SCALeI
Do ycfu often buy things on inpulse?
Do you often get into a jam because you do things without thinking?
r^'^i^'^ P^^£^ ^ 1°^ involvii>5 change, travel and variety eventhough It might be insecure? ,
Do you like planning things carefully ahead of time?
Do you save regularly?
Do you enjoy taking risks?
Would you rather plan things than do things?
Do you generally do and say things without stopping to think?
Do you usually make up your mind quickly?
When the odds are against you, do you still usually think it worth
taking a chance?
Would you make sure you had another job before giving im your old
one?
Can you waks decisions quickly?
Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?
Are you an inpulsive person?
Would you enjoy parachute jurrping?
Would regular health check-i:^ make you feel better?
When you go on a trip, do you like to plan routes and timetables
carefully?
Are you slow and unhurried in the way you move?
Would life with no danger in it be too dull for you?
Are you rather cautious in unusual situations?
Do you often do things on the spur of the moment?
Do you often get involved in things you later wish you could get out
of?
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in
Would you enjoy fast driving?
Do you prefer activities that Must hanrv.n' -h^ -f-v,
advance? "^ppe to those planned
Do you usually speak before thinking things out?
Would you do almost anything for a dare?
Can you put your thou^ts into words quickly?
it ^i^^f'^'^ to live each day as
SvS^t^^^f'^Lie^^;3r^ ^ ^^^^^
Do you prefer to 'sle^ on it' before making decisions?
Do you often change your interests?
Do you need to use a lot of self-control to keep out of trouble?
When on vacation, do you look for relaxation instead of excitement?
Do you think an eveniiig out is more successful if it is unplanned or
arranged at the last moment?
Are you usually carefree?
Before maJcing your mind, do you carefully consider all the
advantages and disadvantages?
Do you get bored more easily than most people, doing the same old
things?
Would you agree that planning things takes the fun out of life?
Do you get extremely inpatient if you are kept waiting by someone
v^o is late?
Are you an easy going person, not generally bothered about having
everything just right?
Do you often long for excitement?
Do you hate standing in a long line for anything?
^ Subjects circled "YES" or "NO" in response to the items.
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APPEM)IX F
STUDY 2 QUESnCMqArRE ITEMS
Cheating Ttrma
Importance
^ether or not I cheat on a test or exam is an teportant issue for
"true 1 2 3 4 5 g _
I have strong feelings regarding cheating on tests or exams/^^
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Ihoucdit
I have thou^t a lot about using a false excuse to get out of takinga test or turning in an assignment on time.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Control Beliefs
In most of my tests or exams, I sit close to other students
tnie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Most of the tests or exams I take are closely si^^ervised
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Most of the tests or exams I take are in small classes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
I have respect for most of my teachers.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Different test forms are usually distributed for most of my tests or
exams.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
I usually sit near friends in roost of my tests or exams,
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In most of ray tests or exams, the professor doesn't seem to care
about cheating.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
In most of my tests or exams, books and papers can be left out.
true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Control Evaluations
Sitting close to other students during a test or exam makes cheating
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Close sii^jervision of a test or exam makes cheating
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Small class size makes cheating on a test or exam
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Having respect for the professor makes cheating on a test or exam
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Different forms of a test or exam make cheating
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
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Sitting near friencls during a test or exam nakes cheating
n^professor not cari^'alxx^t ^tin^ :^'cheatl^ onTSS'or
Bc^ ar.. papers bei^ left cxxt ciurl^ a test or exa^ ^TjS^l^^^^^567 difficult
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Shoplifting Itpmg
Control Beliefs
in^^t stores I visit, there are usually a lot of etployees around.
^to^!^ ' """^"^ "^"^ enployees t^ waSi^
^® 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 falMost stores I visit have security systems ^
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 falseMost stores I visit have security guards on duty
1 2 3 4 5 6
*
7 falsemere usually aren't many other custcsners artxind when I visit a
store.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 falseMost things I mi^t want are small enou^ to be hidden in my iacket
or purse. ^
^® 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Most stores are equipped with cameras for monitoring customers,
tr^e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Most of the stores I visit are relatively small.
^® 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Control Evaluations
Having a lot of employees around makes taking something from a store
without paying
^ .1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Mirrors in the store make taking something without paying®^ .1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Security systems in the store make taking something without paying
.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Security guards on duty make taking something without paying
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Not having many other customers around makes taking something
without paying
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Small size of the item makes taJcing it from the store without paying
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Having cameras in the store makes taking something without paying
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Small store size makes taking something without paying
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
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Lying Item.^
Control Beliefs
I know roost of ray professors pretty well
^® 1 2 3 4 5* 6 7Most of my professors are lenient.
1 2 3 4 567 ^-1
I am good at making up excuses. false
true 1 2 3 4 5 g
Most of professors require proof before letti:^ peLle out^?taking a test or turning in an assignment on time
^® 1 2 3 4 5 fi*-7
I am a good actor. ^
^
^® 1234567 falIt is usually ray fault v^en I am not prepared to take a test or^
exam.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 falseWhen I am not prepared to take a test or exam, it is usually because
I have something important to do.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 falseIf I get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on time
ray work would just pile up. '
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false
Control Evaluations
Knowing my professor makes using a false excuse to get out of taking
a test or turning in an assignment on time
^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Having a lenient professor makes using a false excuse to get out of
taking a test or turning in an assignment on time
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Being good at making up excuses makes using a false excuse to get
out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on time
easy_ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Needing to provide proof makes using a false excuse to get out of
taking a test or turning in an assignment on time
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Being a good actor makes using a false excuse to get out of taking a
test or turning in an assignment on time
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Knowing that it is ray fault for not being prepared makes using a
false excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment
on time
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Having scaryething inportant to do makes using a false excuse to get
out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on time
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
Knowing that it would cause iry work to pile up makes using a false
excuse to get out of taking a test or turning in an assignment on
time
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
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